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WHEN DO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
NEGOTIATE AWAY THEIR CORPORATE
TAX BASE?
MARTIN HEARSON*
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, London, UK
Abstract: Developing countries have concluded thousands of bilateral tax treaties, which restrict
their ‘taxing rights’ over international investment. Qualitative case studies of these negotiation
outcomes emphasize power politics, knowledge asymmetries and negotiating capability in the
eventual distribution of taxing rights between signatories, yet such insights are absent from cross-
country quantitative work. This paper bridges the gap by replicating two quantitative studies,
introducing new data on countries’ ability to mobilize tax revenue and the outcomes of tax treaty
negotiations. It provides statistical support for the insights from qualitative research. The size of a
government’s revenue base, and its reliance on corporate tax, might affect the salience of the revenue
sacriﬁce in policy makers’ minds. These variables inﬂuence the likelihood of signing a tax treaty and
the particular concessions made. Power asymmetries between signatories lead to more unequal
distributions of taxing rights away from developing countries, in contrast to the ﬁndings of earlier
studies. Developing countries also become better negotiators as they gain experience. © 2018
UNU-WIDER. Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: developing countries; foreign direct investment; corporate taxation; double taxation
treaties; multinational corporations
JEL Classiﬁcation: F53; H25; K34; O23
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the 1960s, developing countries have signed over 2000 bilateral tax treaties (BTTs).1
Often referred to as ‘double taxation agreements’, these treaties’ main effect is to constrain
*Correspondence to: Martin Hearson, Fellow in International Political Economy, Department of International
Relations, London School of Economics, London, UK.
E-mail: m.hearson@lse.ac.uk
1Although the term ‘bilateral tax treaty’ (BTT) is used throughout this paper, it is interchangeable with the terms
‘double taxation treaty’, ‘double taxation agreement’ and ‘double taxation convention’.
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developing countries’ ability to tax inward investors, ostensibly to relieve double taxation
and hence to attract inward investment. Quantitative studies of tax treaty negotiation have
generally assumed that negotiation decisions by developing countries reﬂect a rational
assessment of the costs and beneﬁts (Barthel & Neumayer, 2012; Chisik & Davies,
2004; Rixen & Schwarz, 2009). In contrast, qualitative case studies, admittedly anecdotal,
have repeatedly suggested that negotiating outcomes often reﬂect asymmetries of power,
knowledge and bargaining skill and that developing countries’ approach to negotiating
tax treaties under these constraints has been ‘boundedly’ rational at best (Hearson &
Kangave, 2016; Irish, 1974; Kangave, 2009). In a bounded rationality framework,
negotiators and policy makers with limited capacity to assimilate information will resort
to heuristics, for example, by according a greater weight to information that is ‘more
available’ because it is easier to understand or obtain (Poulsen, 2014; Weyland, 2007).
This paper replicates two quantitative studies that analyse tax treaty negotiations,
introducing a bounded rationality perspective. Barthel and Neumayer (2012) developed
a model that suggested competition for inward investment drove developing countries’
decisions to enter into tax treaties. Rixen and Schwarz (2009) studied the negotiated
content of tax treaties, suggesting that capital-importing countries negotiated harder when
the ﬁscal sacriﬁce entailed by a treaty had the potential to cost them more. Asymmetries in
power, knowledge and skill were largely absent from the results of these studies. This
replication changes that by incorporating two new sources of data: the ICTD Government
Revenue Dataset (Prichard, Cobham, & Goodall, 2014), which provides the developing
country’s tax performance and reliance on corporate tax, and the ActionAid Tax Treaties
Dataset (Hearson, 2016), which gives a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of
treaty negotiation outcomes, for a much larger sample of treaties. With these data, we
can gain an idea of the importance of the revenue sacriﬁce in a tax treaty to a government’s
revenue base and hence how salient the sacriﬁce may be to policy makers. We can also
segment the negotiating outcome between different treaty clauses, some of which are more
striking and easily understood than others. The analysis also examines how power and
investment asymmetries affect negotiating outcomes and how negotiation outcomes
change as a country gains experience.
This paper informs a growing international debate about the appropriateness of
existing networks of tax treaties for developing countries. South Africa, Rwanda,
Argentina, Mongolia, Zambia and Malawi are among the developing counties who have
cancelled or renegotiated tax treaties in recent years, while others, such as Uganda, are
undertaking reviews (Hearson, 2015). Perhaps in response to the international debate
and the threat of further cancellations, the Netherlands and Ireland have also reviewed
the impact of their treaty networks on developing countries (IBFD, 2015; Netherlands
Ministry of Finance, 2013). The OECD (2014b) has produced guidance to ‘make it
easier for countries to justify their decisions not to enter into tax treaties with certain
low or no-tax jurisdictions’. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2014a, p. 24) states
that developing countries ‘would be well-advised to sign treaties only with considerable
caution’. Non-governmental organizations including Tax Justice Network Africa,
ActionAid and SOMO have published reports critical of tax treaties from a development
perspective (Hearson, 2015; McGauran, 2013; Weyzig & Van Dijk, 2007). This builds
on a longstanding tradition of critical legal scholarship questioning the value of tax
treaties to developing countries (e.g. Avi-Yonah, 2009; Brooks & Krever, 2015;
Christians, 2005; Dagan, 2000; Irish, 1974; Paolini, Pistone, Pulina, & Zagler, 2016;
Thuronyi, 2010).
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The next section gives some context by setting out the debates in existing literature on
the wisdom of signing treaties for developing countries. Section 3 then summarizes the
existing studies on the determinants of tax treaty negotiation outcomes. Section 4 sets
out the bounded rationality framework through a series of hypotheses to be tested. In
sections 5 and 6, the results of the two replications are reported. Section 7 provides a
robustness test and concludes the paper.
2 THE QUESTIONABLE CASE FOR TAX TREATIES
The formal function of BTTs, reﬂected in the commonly used term ‘double taxation
agreement’ and in the title of most treaties (‘agreement for the relief of double taxation
…’), is to promote trade and investment by reducing the potential that companies operating
in the two countries will be taxed twice on the same income. For example, the commentary
to the OECDModel Tax Convention on Income and Capital (‘the OECD model’), which is
the starting point for most negotiated BTTs, states that ‘The principal purpose of double
taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double taxation,
exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons’ (OECD,
2014a, p. 59).
Bilateral tax treaties set boundaries on when and how each country is entitled to tax
income earned in one treaty partner by residents of the other, most usually multinational
companies. In a stylised negotiation between a developing country (capital importer, or
‘source’ country) and a developed country (capital exporter, or ‘residence’ country), the
developing country accepts constraints on its ability to tax inward investors. These
constraints can be considered in three categories:
• Withholding tax (WHT) rates. The most visible and easy-to-understand effect of a
tax treaty is to ﬁx a maximum rate at which the capital importing country can tax
dividends, interest payments, royalties and fees for management, technical and
consultancy services (‘service fees’) paid to residents of the treaty partner. These
maximum rates are usually lower than the rates in domestic law, and sometimes, they
are even zero, giving special tax treatment to the foreign resident. Interest, royalties
and fees can usually be deducted from a company’s taxable proﬁts in its operating
country, which means that, if they are not taxed in the recipient country, they may
not be taxed at all. When WHT are lowered or eliminated by a tax treaty, this creates
a stronger incentive for multinational ﬁrms to use them to shift proﬁts to a location
where they will not be taxed.
• Permanent establishment (PE). Another major aspect of tax treaties, PE is a minimum
level of activity that a foreign resident must have in the source country before it can be
liable for tax there on its proﬁts. Some aspects of the PE deﬁnition are binary
distinctions. For example, delivery warehouses and the collection of insurance premiums
may be ruled in or out of the deﬁnition, depending on the outcome of negotiations. In
general, the PE deﬁnition in treaties states that the taxpayer must operate through a ﬁxed
place of business. There are also quantitative criteria that, like the WHT rates, are the
subject of negotiations over the precise ﬁgures. The minimum number of days before
a construction site constitutes a PE is the most common quantitative criterion.
• Other provisions. Many of the other variations within the treaty are in clauses that
exclude or include particular types of income earned in the source country by residents
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of the other signatory from taxation there. This typically includes certain types of capital
gains, pensions, social security payments and salaries.
In return for these concessions, the developed country agrees to bear the cost of
eliminating any remaining double taxation incurred by its outward investors, by making
allowances for the taxes they pay in the developing country. In practice, rather than
relieving double taxation, the most signiﬁcant effect of a BTT between a developed and
a developing country is to shift the burden of doing so from the former to the latter
(Avi-Yonah, 2009; Brooks & Krever, 2015; Dagan, 2000; Irish, 1974; Paolini et al.,
2016; Thuronyi, 2010). This is because most developed countries already take unilateral
steps to relieve double taxation on their investors, either by giving them a credit for taxes
paid abroad or increasingly by exempting foreign-source income from domestic tax
altogether (PWC, 2013). Indeed, a developed country that uses the credit system may raise
more tax revenue as a result of the treaty, because the tax liability in the developing
country, and hence the credit against home country tax, falls. This has led critical legal
scholars to describe the rationale for BTTs as ‘a myth’ (Dagan, 2000) or ‘aid in reverse’
(Irish, 1974). Conversely, if developed countries instead exempt their outward investors
from tax on the proﬁts they make in developing countries (whether through treaties or their
tax laws), this may compromise developing countries’ ability to tax those investors. This is
because, if investors face no further tax on their earnings beyond that incurred in the host
state, they have a greater incentive to encourage tax competition between potential host
states or to try to avoid paying tax in them (IMF, 2014a; Matheson, Perry, & Veung,
2013; Mullins, 2006).
These legal arguments notwithstanding, the view that tax treaties will stimulate
investment into developing countries is pervasive (Hearson, 2015). Yet the evidence for
such an effect is inconclusive. Until 2009, academic studies found a mixed effect of tax
treaties on investment ﬂows: positive, neutral or in some instances negative, the latter
attributed to tax evading investors likely to be put off by the improved enforcement powers
provided by tax treaties (Blonigen & Davies, 2004; Coupé, Orlova, & Skiba, 2009; Davies,
2004; Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr, et al., 2006; Louie & Rousslang, 2008; Millimet &
Kumas, 2009; Neumayer, 2007). Positive effects on investment were more commonly
found for treaties between developed countries than those involving a developing country.
Since then, the balance has tipped towards studies ﬁnding positive effects through the use
of more comprehensive bilateral investment data (Barthel, Busse, & Neumayer, 2009;
Lejour, 2014) and foreign afﬁliate microdata (Blonigen, Oldenski, & Sly, 2014; Davies,
Norbäck, & Tekin-Koru, 2009; Egger & Merlo, 2011).
There is, however, room to draw different conclusions from the results of these studies.
Those that use aggregate investment data employ a dyadic approach, which means that
they assess the extent to which a treaty between A and B corresponds to higher investment
into A from B. None controls fully for treaty shopping, in which investors from C into A
use an intermediate vehicle in B to take advantage of the treaty, a phenomenon for which
Lejour (2014) ﬁnds support, and which Weyzig (2013) documents using Dutch microdata.
Firm-level data avoid this difﬁculty, but coverage of developing countries is poor, a
problem given the differential effects found in earlier studies. Only Davies et al. (2009)
have sufﬁcient coverage of sub-Saharan countries, for example, to be able to draw any
conclusions about that region. These studies are all to different degrees susceptible to
the concern that what they are measuring is tax treaties’ responding to, rather than causing,
changing patterns of inward investment.
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All in all, we cannot say with certainty that tax treaties have generated new investment
into their developing country signatories, nor can we say that there is a compelling legal
rationale to motivate the conclusion of tax treaties given their costs. The academic
literature therefore does not give policy makers in developing countries any clear
conclusions about the likely costs and beneﬁts to them of tax treaties. They may, of course,
have access to data from their own country that are not available to academic researchers,
in particular revenue data with which to calculate the potential costs, and qualitative
information with which to evaluate the demand from potential investors. They may also
have political and economic objectives beyond the immediate attraction of investment that
may be served by a treaty, such as the desire to heighten tax enforcement cooperation with
the treaty partner, the need to satisfy the interests of particular domestic constituencies who
will beneﬁt from the treaty or the aim of strengthening diplomatic ties with another country
(Christians, 2005; Pickering, 2013). Nonetheless, it is likely that tax treaty policy is made
in conditions of considerable uncertainty about treaties’ potential to promote inward
investment. The challenge, in that case, is to explain why so many BTTs have been
concluded by developing countries and why many of these BTTs appear to have, as Irish
(1974) observed 40 years ago, a bias towards residence taxation.
3 EXISTING STUDIES OF TAX TREATY NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES
One common answer to this puzzle is to note that, if a country’s competitors have signed
tax treaties with key capital exporting countries, its incentives change and policy makers
may seek to conclude tax treaties to maintain their competitive position (Baistrocchi,
2008). To date, the only quantitative study to have explicitly investigated this hypothesis
is a survival analysis performed by Barthel and Neumayer (2012). In this result,
competition between countries is found to have a signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood that
a particular pair of countries will conclude a tax treaty. This was the case when competition
was measured as the number of treaties signed by countries in the same region or by
countries exporting a similar basket of goods.
Other authors have investigated the determinants of negotiation outcomes. For one
school of thought, negotiation outcomes reﬂect the rational preferences of the countries
negotiating. Chisik and Davies (2004) and Rixen and Schwarz (2009) studied how the
WHT rates in tax treaties varied with the balance of foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks
between the two signatories, the former using US treaties and those between OECD
members, and the latter German treaties. Both studies examined the circumstances in
which WHT rates were higher, protecting the source taxation rights of the capital
importing country. They found that one determinant of higher WHT rates was a more
asymmetrical distribution of FDI stocks between the treaty partners, a situation in which
the cost of lowering WHT rates would fall disproportionately more on the capital importer.
This seems to conﬁrm Goldberg’s (1983) observation that ‘treaty partners having unequal
income ﬂows will allocate jurisdiction to tax so as to achieve a more even balance between
the two extremes’. It is worth noting that these studies did not explicitly examine the case
of treaties signed by developing countries, of which there were relatively few within their
samples.
Support for this ‘rational negotiation’ viewpoint can also be found in an International
Bureau for Fiscal Documentation survey analysing 30 provisions of 1811 tax treaties
signed since 1997. These provisions include the main variations between the two main
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international model conventions used in negotiations: the OECD and UN models (Wijnen
& de Goede, 2013). The UN model allows developing countries to retain more of their
source taxation rights than the OECD model, and so can be regarded as a better outcome
for a developing country that wishes to conclude a treaty while retaining its taxing rights
over foreign investors. At 37 per cent of total provisions, the UN model was more common
in treaties between non-OECD countries than in treaties between OECD countries, where it
made up 25 per cent of provisions. Treaties between OECD and non-OECD countries,
which may be a proxy for treaties between countries that have a predominantly one-way
FDI relationship, were on average composed of 30 per cent UN provisions (Wijnen &
de Goede, 2013, p. 66). Notably, UN model provisions comprised a minority of clauses
in all three groups.
Hearson (2016) examined these trends in more detail using a new dataset of tax treaties
signed by 43 low and lower middle-income countries between 1970 and 2014.2 This study
found a widening gap in the content of treaties between these countries and OECD
member states, compared with those with non-OECD states. The former had become more
‘residence’ based over time, restricting more of the developing countries’ taxing rights
over investment from the treaty partner, while the latter had become more ‘source’ based,
giving developing countries greater taxing rights. Disaggregation by type of provision
indicated that the overall increase in the ‘source’ tax orientation of tax treaties was driven
by more expansive PE provisions and masked a decline in the maximum WHT rates
stipulated by the treaties. Disaggregation by region and income group also indicated
differential trends. For example, treaties signed between sub-Saharan countries and OECD
member states had become more ‘residence’ based. African least-developed countries,
whose treaties were signiﬁcantly more residence based in the 1970s, now appear to leave
intact the same level of protection for their source taxing rights as those negotiated by other
countries in the same region. Asian countries’ treaties had become more source-based
across the board, except for treaties with OECD countries, where there had been no change
over time. In a similar vein, Dauer and Krever (2012) survey tax treaties in 11 African
countries. Their survey ﬁnds marked differences between some countries and notes that
‘as a group, these African countries appear not to have been as successful as Asian
countries in retaining taxing rights’. These trends over time and space suggest that more
work is needed to understand the determinants of tax treaty negotiation outcomes.
Critical legal scholarship emphasizes differentials in analytical capability, negotiating
skill and economic power, suggesting that rational actor models alone are insufﬁcient. In
an early essay on the subject, Irish (1974) argues that developing countries are ‘unaware’
of the disadvantages of tax treaties and ‘have or believe they have a relatively weak
bargaining position’ and that developed countries ‘have a propensity to take advantage’
of these two deﬁcits. Aukonobera (2012) argues that ‘Uganda has a weak tax treaty
negotiation team that concludes treaties more intensively reﬂecting the position of the
other contracting state’, while Quinones Cruz (2012) reports that in Colombia in the
2000s a policy of ‘attracting investment at any price’ led to poorly prepared negotiations
that resulted in an outcome that was less favourable to Colombia than might otherwise
have resulted.
2The sample contains 519 treaties, those signed by low and lower-middle income countries in sub-Saharan Africa
and Asia, excluding G20 member states. Of those countries, 43 had signed treaties when the dataset was
compiled.
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4 HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
This paper replicates two of the main studies cited earlier: Barthel and Neumayer (2012)
and Rixen and Schwarz (2009).3 The ﬁrst of these papers ﬁnds evidence that competition
between countries increases the likelihood of signing a tax treaty, using a model that
incorporates a number of control variables, such as diplomatic and trade links between
the two countries, but not ﬁscal data. By incorporating information on taxes raised, we
can test a model of policymakers’ behaviour under the conﬂicting imperatives of attracting
inward investment and raising tax revenue from it. Developing country governments that
are struggling to raise tax may be more reticent to sign tax treaties, because they would
be more concerned about the revenue sacriﬁce. In contrast, countries that already raise a
signiﬁcant amount of tax may be more willing to sign tax treaties because they have a
larger tax base, and so, the ﬁscal costs of tax treaties may seem less signiﬁcant. A further
nuance, however, is that countries for which corporate tax is a larger share of the total tax
base may be less willing to sign tax treaties, because in that case, the revenue sacriﬁce is
potentially greater as a share of government revenue.
H1A: countries with a larger tax base are more likely to sign tax treaties.
H1B: countries whose tax base depends more on corporate tax are less likely to sign tax
treaties.
The Rixen and Schwarz (2009) paper ﬁnds that WHT rates in tax treaties, but not PE
provisions, tend to be more generous to the net capital importing country in a dyad when
the FDI relationship is more asymmetrical, in other words when the capital importer has
more to lose. This supports the idea that a higher ﬁscal cost leads to a tougher negotiating
stance by a developing country but only for the easiest provisions to understand. This can
be contextualized by adding in ﬁscal data, because the ﬁscal cost may be more or less
salient to policymakers in a developing country government depending on how much it
needs the revenue:
H2A: countries with a larger tax base are less likely to protect it in negotiations.
H2B: countries whose tax base depends more on corporate tax are more likely to protect it
in negotiations, especially in more salient (easier to understand) areas such as
withholding tax rates.
Two competing (or complementary) explanations can be tested alongside this. A power-
based explanation of treaty negotiation outcomes suggests that countries with greater
material capabilities are more likely to negotiate treaties reﬂecting their interests. This is
a view that has some support in the area of bilateral investment treaties (Allee & Peinhardt,
2014). When Rixen and Schwarz (2009) tested for this, they found no effect, but it will be
tested for again here:
3While each of these papers contains numerous robustness checks using different speciﬁcations, the focus here is
on the two main preferred models.
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H3: the greater the power asymmetry in negotiations, the less the treaty protects the tax
base of the less powerful signatory.
A second explanation is that of Rixen and Schwarz (2009) that greater asymmetries in
investment will lead to increased source taxing rights in the treaty. This, they argue, is
because the capital importing country will face a greater ﬁscal cost from restrictions on
source taxation and seek to mitigate that cost before it is willing to conclude a treaty:
H4: the greater the FDI asymmetry, the more the treaty content protects the tax base of the
net capital importer.
Finally, as some studies cited earlier suggested, lack of knowledge and negotiating
experience capacity may be one reason that developing countries sign treaties costing them
signiﬁcant amounts of revenue. Hearson (2016) gives examples of developing countries
such as Vietnam and Zambia, whose negotiated treaties were less source-based when they
ﬁrst negotiated them but became more source-based over time. In Uganda, Mongolia and
China, governments have shifted to more source-based negotiating positions after
observing the effects of treaties in force (Hearson & Kangave, 2016; Li, 2012; Michielse,
2012). This leads to a ﬁnal hypothesis. We might expect to see a learning effect, especially
in elements of the treaty whose importance an inexperienced negotiator might not be aware
of:
H5: the more treaties that a developing country has signed, the better negotiating
outcomes it obtains, especially for less salient, more technically obscure treaty provisions.
5 EFFECT OF TAX PERFORMANCE ON THE DECISION TO SIGN A
TREATY
5.1 Data and Methods
This part of the paper replicates the article by Barthel and Neumayer (2012), beginning
from the replication dataset made available by Eric Neumayer. They develop a Cox
proportional hazard that estimates the likelihood of a dyad of countries signing a tax treaty
using ‘spatial lag’ variables capturing the competition effects. This model predicts the
likelihood that a given dyad will conclude a treaty at a given time. The likelihood is
expressed as follows:
h t X ijtY ijt
  ¼ h0 tð Þ exp βX ijt þ γY ijt
 
:
Here, h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, Xijt represents control variables that are
attributes of the dyad and Yijt represents the ‘spatial lag’ variables capturing the
competition effects (Neumayer & Plümper, 2010); i and j are the two dyad members,
and t is the year.
‘Spatial lags’ weight the impact of a given treaty conclusion on the country dyad in
question by different factors that proxy competition between countries.4 The weighting
of the ﬁrst spatial lag compares the makeup of products exported by the two countries that
4A third spatial lag, export market similarity, was found to be non-signiﬁcant.
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signed a treaty with that of the two countries in the dyad on whom competitive pressure is
being measured. For example, if a country whose exports are dominated by sugar signs a
BTT, this will increase the likelihood of signature in all other dyads that include a country
for whom sugar exports are important. The second spatial lag takes into account treaty
signatures by countries in the same region: a treaty between Ghana and Germany increases
the likelihood of signature in all other dyads including both sub-Saharan African and
European countries. The authors assumed that in both competition scenarios, it is the
capital importer in the dyad on which the competition acts.
The controls include several variables where the attributes of the two dyad members are
combined by multiplying them together: population, gross domestic products (GDPs) per
capita, de facto trade openness and political constraints. Several binary variables measure
the attributes of the dyad itself: whether it includes one or two OECD countries, whether its
members already have a bilateral investment treaty, whether they are part of a regional
trade agreement, whether one of them is an offshore ﬁnancial centre (OFC), and whether
they have diplomatic representation in each other’s capitals. Finally, several variables
capture other attributes of the dyad: the volume of trade between the countries, the distance
between them, the number of years;’ independence for the dyad member most recently
independent, the maximum number of tax treaties signed by one of the dyad members,
and the cumulative number of tax treaties that each member has signed. Some of these
variables are transformed or lagged as indicated in Annex Table A1. The data sources
and further explanation are given in Barthel and Neumayer (2012, p. 649–652).
The replication dataset runs from 1969 to 2005, while some of the other datasets used in this
replication cover only recent years. I therefore recreated the replication dataset from the original
sources speciﬁed in Barthel and Neumayer (2012, p. 652), including the spatial lags, for the
period 2004 to 2012, appending this to the existing data obtained from the authors. Descriptive
statistics are given in the annex (table A1), and the original and re-estimated models are shown
in Table 1, columns 1 and 2. Although some of the model coefﬁcients change in magnitude and
signiﬁcance, the orders of magnitude are broadly the same. These changes seem to represent
underlying changes in the role of explanatory variables since 2005, rather than errors in the
re-estimated data: the original and new data overlap in 2004, when the values of the spatial lags
(explanatory variables) from the original and extended datasets have an 88 per cent correlation.
To test the hypotheses given earlier, the model has been amended to incorporate
explanatory variables that relate only to the capital-importing country, designated i, in each
dyad. This gives the following equation:
h tjX ijtY ijtZit
  ¼ h0 tð Þ exp βX ijt þ γY ijt þ δZit
 
:
While the variables in the original dataset are largely dyadic, the variables within δZit
apply only to the capital importing country because this is the country that would make
most of the revenue sacriﬁce by signing a treaty. A simple approach was taken to identify
the capital importer in each dyad: countries were assigned to their respective World Bank
income groups, and the country in the dyad that was the lower income of the two was
identiﬁed as the capital importer. Where the countries were in the same income group,
no ﬁscal data were added, so these dyads dropped out of the sample along with those
for which data were not available. This means that all dyads in the subsample with ﬁscal
data include one low-income or middle-income country. The variable ‘OECD-OECD’, a
dummy for dyads in which both countries are OECD members, therefore becomes
redundant. A better approach may have been to use dyadic data to ensure the correct
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identiﬁcation of capital importers and exporters, but the lack of comprehensive, historical
dyadic data would have signiﬁcantly reduced the number of observations, which were
already reduced by 90 per cent in order to include the ﬁscal data.
The ﬁrst of two ﬁscal variables measures the size of the tax base through total
government revenue as a share of GDP (‘Revenue/GDP’).5 The expected outcome
following from H1A is that a higher value of this variable increases the likelihood that a
government will be willing to sign tax treaties, because the government has a larger
revenue base from which to make the sacriﬁce entailed. The second ﬁscal variable, which
tests dependence on corporate tax, is corporate tax as a share of total revenue (‘CIT/
Revenue’).6 Applying H1B to this measure, a higher value of this variable should reduce
the likelihood that a government will be willing to sign treaties, because the government
has a smaller tax base outside of corporate tax, and the revenue sacriﬁce from corporate
tax is therefore more important as a share of the government’s total tax base.
One further explanatory variable is included. The amount of tax raised by a developing
country might reﬂect the quality and size of its tax policy-making and administrative
functions. If so, we might expect this to translate into a greater capacity to negotiate tax
treaties, resulting in greater propensity to sign treaties and a more source-based outcome
in negotiations. In reality, measures of total tax as a share of GDP tell us little about a
country’s absolute negotiating capacity, because that depends much more on total absolute
government revenue than on any indicator as a share of GDP. Furthermore, corporate tax as
a share of total tax is unlikely to be related to bureaucratic quality, because it is a measure of
the composition of the resourcing for government capacity, not the size of that capacity.
Therefore, to control for the capacity of the developing country’s bureaucracy, the
bureaucratic capacity component of the International Country Risk Guide is used, a widely
used dataset beginning in 1984 (The PRS Group, 2017). This indicator is based on expert
assessments, and its authors state that it measures the strength and expertise of a
bureaucracy, which is considered to lead to a degree of autonomy from political pressures.
This variable should be used with caution, because international tax policy tends to be a
small, specialist function within most governments, with treaty negotiations frequently
led by one individual. A general indicator of bureaucratic quality across the whole of
government may not therefore reﬂect the knowledge or capabilities of the individual or
handful of individuals responsible for negotiations. Indeed, it may serve to measure how
constrained these individuals are within a system of bureaucratic checks and balances. A
higher score on this measure could mean that tax treaty policy-making is undertaken by
specialist civil servants with greater technical knowledge and thus less beholden to the
whims of ‘boundedly rational’ non-specialists, especially politicians. In an ideal world, it
would be better to construct a bespoke indicator based on the number, years of experience
and specialist training of such specialist staff, but in the meantime, the general indicator
has been included in all models.
5‘Total government revenue, excluding grants and social contributions’.
6‘Total income and proﬁt taxes on corporations, including taxes on resource ﬁrms’. This includes domestic as well
as foreign-owned ﬁrms. It would have been preferable to include capital gains taxes, the other main corporate tax
regulated by tax treaties, within this analysis, but the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset does not provide such a
ﬁgure for companies separately from that for individuals. The dataset also does not specify whether WHT is
included within the measure of taxes on corporations. Indicative examinations of some developing country budget
data by the author suggest that WHT is rarely given as a separate line and that WHT where it is the measure often
includes all WHTs, whether levied on individuals and companies, domestic or foreign.
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Including these new variables in the sample signiﬁcantly reduces the number of available
observations, from 289226 in column 2 to 18 357 in column 3 of Table 1. Despite this, most
of the coefﬁcients in the subsample column 3 stay at a similar magnitude, sign and
signiﬁcance, with the notable exception of export product similarity (one of the spatial legs
measuring competition), whose sign changes in the subsample. This would mean that
countries are less sensitive to tax treaty-based competition when the competitor exports
more similar products to them, which is a counterintuitive result, but this variable also
becomes non-signiﬁcant when its sign changes in the subsample. The sample with all
variables included is less than 10 per cent of the size of that without, and some bias may have
been introduced. Only treaties signed by developing countries are included, for a start. One
other change is that the mean number of treaties concluded in the past and the number of
observations in which a new treaty is signed are both higher for the sample with ﬁscal data.
This in part reﬂects the later time period, the ﬁscal and quality data running from 1984 rather
than 1969 as in the original sample. In sum, in the (more recent) years for which data are
available, developing countries for which ﬁscal and bureaucratic quality data are available
(and their treaty partners) have more tax treaties, as well as appearing not to be susceptible
to competition on the basis of export product similarity.
5.2 Results
The revenue/GDP ratio does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the likelihood of signing a treaty
(column 4), but the share of corporation tax in total revenue (column 5) has a signiﬁcant and
positive effect. This is the opposite result to that inferred from H1A and H1B. Countries that
depend more on corporation tax are more likely to sign tax treaties, but countries with more
revenue overall are no more likely to do so. One possible explanation is that the measure of
corporate tax as a share of total revenue is positively associated with the effective tax rate
incurred by investors. Where this is the case, the dyadic data here may reﬂect pressure from
investors from the capital exporting country who wish it to obtain a treaty with the
developing country in order to reduce their effective tax rates. Bureaucratic quality does
not have any effect on the likelihood of signing a treaty in these models.
6 EFFECT OF TAX PERFORMANCE ON NEGOTIATED CONTENT OF
TREATIES
6.1 Data and Methods
6.1.1 Dependent variables
The starting point for this second replication is Rixen and Schwarz’s (2009) study of
German tax treaties. The study included 45 German treaties for which investment data
were available and measured the determinants of several treaty provisions. In the ﬁrst
speciﬁcation, the dependent variable was the WHT rate, with dummies added for the type
of WHT such that each treaty constituted four or ﬁve observations (depending on whether
the treaty included different WHTs for certain dividends). In the second speciﬁcation, the
minimum number of months for a construction site to count as a PE was used as the
dependent variable. The study found a positive relationship between FDI asymmetry and
WHT rates, suggesting that the capital importer adopts a tougher negotiating stance when
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the ﬁscal cost is higher. They also tested the effect of FDI asymmetry on the PE deﬁnition but
found only a weak effect. This could be because they used only one aspect of the PE
deﬁnition, the number of months’ presence required for a construction site to become taxable.
For this replication, the model to be tested is as follows:
τij ¼ βX ij þ γY i þ ε:
In this model, τij is the dependent variable, representing the value of a composite index
expressing the balance between source and residence taxation in the treaty between
developing country i and its treaty partner j. Four different speciﬁcations are used, one
for each of the four indices discussed in the following. On the right hand side of the
equation, Xij is a set of variables describing properties of the dyad, while the variables
represented by Yi apply only to the developing country in the dyad, as deﬁned in Hearson
(2016). The stochastic element of the model is represented by ε.
Rather than a direct replication, this is a slightly different model and a very different
dataset to that used by Rixen and Schwarz. One reason for this is that the overlap between
German tax treaties and countries for which the other data were available in the relevant
years was very small. In particular, the dependent variables are drawn from Hearson
(2016). This includes 519 tax treaties signed by low and lower middle-income countries
in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In contrast, most of the 45 treaties in Rixen and Schwarz’s
dataset were between Germany and developed countries, and only one treaty, between
Germany and Pakistan, appears in both datasets.
Another difference is the way in which the relevant content of the treaty is included
within the dependent variable. Rixen and Schwarz included each type of WHT rate
speciﬁed by a treaty as separate observations within their model, with a dummy for the
type of WHT. A separate speciﬁcation tested the minimum length of time for a building
site PE. In contrast, the approach in this paper uses the indices developed in Hearson
(2016). These include a much wider set of 24 tax treaty provisions with a distributional
impact that can vary in individual negotiations. Each of these variations has been coded
between zero and one, where one means a provision through which the developing country
retains more of its (‘source’) taxing rights, and zero a provision through which it retains
less (‘residence’ taxation). Aggregate indices are then calculated as follows:
τij ¼ ∑
k
1πij
k
:
In this calculation, τij is the index value for the treaty between i and j, calculated as the
sum of the coded values for the individual provisions that form the index in the treaty πij,
divided by the number of provisions included in the index k. This gives an average value
between 0 and 1 for the clauses included within each index. A higher value in an index
means a negotiation in which the developing country has accepted fewer restrictions on
its tax base, across the provisions included within that index.
Four different indices are used as dependent variables here. The treaty provisions included
within each index are speciﬁed in Table 2, and descriptive statistics for the index values within
the sample are included in Table A2. The overall ‘source index’ incorporates all 24 provisions7
and gives a general overview of howmuch the developing country retains its taxing rights in the
treaty. Three sub-indices are also used here. The ﬁrst includes only theWHT rates, including in
7Articles 5(3)(b) and 12A are included twice, as binary and continuous variables.
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each single observation the average of four of the values used by Rixen and Schwarz (2009),
plus an additional one, service fees. The PE index aggregates nine entries, only one of which
is the length of time for a construction site used by Rixen and Schwarz (2009). Finally, the
‘Other’ index includes provisions from other articles of the treaty.
6.1.2 Explanatory variables
The same tax variables as in the ﬁrst replication are used. If developing countries with a
larger tax base are more likely to give it away (H2A), the coefﬁcient of revenue/GDP should
be positive. If developing countries that depend on corporate tax are less likely to give it
away (H2B), the coefﬁcient of revenue/CIT should be negative. These relationships should
Table 2. Construction of indices of treaty content
Index inclusion
Article number in the UN
model tax treaty Description
PE index & Overall
source index
5(3)(a) PE deﬁnition: construction PE length in
months
5(3)(a) PE deﬁnition: supervisory activities associated
with construction
5(3)(b) PE deﬁnition: service PE included
5(3)(b) PE deﬁnition: service PE length in months
5(4)(a) PE deﬁnition: delivery exception to PE
5(4)(b) PE deﬁnition: delivery exception to PE
5(5)(b) PE deﬁnition: stock agent PE
5(6) PE deﬁnition: insurance PE
5(7) PE deﬁnition: dependent agent extension
WHT rates index &
Overall source index
10(2)(a) WHT rate: qualifying [FDI] dividend WHT in
%
10(2)(b) WHT rate: other [portfolio] dividend WHT in
%
11(2) WHT rate: interest WHT in %
12(2) WHT rate: royalties WHT in %
12A(2) WHT rate: management or technical fees rate
12A Management or technical fees included
Overall source index only 12(3) Royalty deﬁnition: ﬁlms or tapes used for
radio or television broadcasting
12(3) Royalty deﬁnition: industrial,
commercial or scientiﬁc equipment
‘Other’ index & Overall
source index
7(1) Limited force of attraction
7(3) No deduction for payments to head ofﬁce
8(2) Source shipping right as a %
13(4) Source capital gains on ’Land rich’ company
13(5) Source capital gains on shares other than those
covered by 13
16(2) Source taxation of earnings by top-level
managerial ofﬁcials
18(2) Shared taxation of pensions
18(2/3) Source taxation of social security pensions
21(3) Source taxation of other income
Source: Hearson (2016)
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differ for the overall source index, the more easily understood WHT index and the indexes
measuring parts of the treaty that are more technically obscure, PE and ‘Other’. Because of
the limited coverage of the ﬁscal data and the bilateral FDI data, these variables cannot be
included in the same model, as would be necessary for a full replication of Rixen and
Schwarz’s study, while retaining sufﬁcient observations to draw meaningful conclusions.
To measure the effect of power on the negotiated outcome, following Rixen and Schwarz
(2009), I use the ratio of countries’ capabilities, based on the Correlates of War project’s
Composite Index of National Capability (version 5.0), which incorporates military
expenditure, industrial production and population size variables (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey,
1972). To obtain the ratio, the capability of the capital exporter is divided by the sum of the
two countries’ capabilities. A higher value of this ratio means that the capital exporting country
has more capabilities relative to the capital importer. If power is a factor in negotiations (H3),
the coefﬁcient of this variable should be negative, meaning that the treaty restricts the
developing country’s taxing rights more when it is less powerful relative to the treaty partner.
To measure the effect of investment asymmetries on negotiations, bilateral data on FDI
stocks are taken from the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (IMF, 2014b). As
with capabilities, the FDI asymmetry is calculated as the stock of FDI from the treaty partner
in the developing country, divided by the sum of bilateral FDI stocks. Where different values
are reported by the two countries, the mean of the FDI stocks in each direction is used to
calculate the ratio. The Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is the best available source
of bilateral FDI data, but it only covers recent years. The ﬁgures used here are for 2012,
the year with the best coverage, regardless of the year of signature.8 Following Rixen and
Schwarz (2009), the coefﬁcient of this variable should be positive, meaning that developing
countries are more concerned to retain more of their taxing rights over inward investment in
treaties where they are overwhelmingly net importers of capital (H4).
To assess the effect of learning on developing countries’ negotiations, the total number
of treaties already signed by the developing country, taken from Hearson (2016), was used.
If developing countries become tougher negotiators as their experience of negotiation
grows, this variable should have a positive coefﬁcient (H5). Other explanatory variables
included are the year of signature, region of the developing country (0 if Asia, 1 if
Africa) and whether or not the treaty partner is an OECD member. All of these variables
are shown in Hearson (2016) to have affected the negotiated content of tax treaties. In
addition, bureaucratic capacity was again included.
6.2 Results
Table 3 gives the results of twelve different speciﬁcations. Four different dependent
variables were used: the overall source index, and the three sub-indices for WHT rates,
PE and other provisions. Each of these were tested in speciﬁcations that included the share
of bilateral FDI stocks that are received by the developing country (‘FDI share’) and two
ﬁscal variables: Revenue/GDP ratio and CIT/Revenue ratio.
In columns 1 to 4, there is a highly signiﬁcant positive association between the size of
the overall tax base and both the overall source index (column 1) and the PE deﬁnition
(column 3) in the treaty, as well as a weaker association with the Other index (column
8An alternative would be to use data on FDI stocks reported by OECD countries in the year of signature, and these
data were used in a robustness test, not reported here, with no difference to the overall result.
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4). In contrast to H2A, countries with a larger tax base are also those most likely to protect
its negotiations. Furthermore, these are all measures that might be affected by the
government’s technical negotiating capacity, because they are predominantly composed
of more technically obscure components of tax treaties, which would be less salient to
negotiators with less technical expertise. In contrast, there is no effect for WHT rates,
despite them being the easiest part of the negotiated settlement to understand at a glance.
Based on the coefﬁcient of 0.988, an increase in the revenue/GDP ratio of 0.076 (one
standard deviation) corresponds to an increase in the PE index of 0.075. Because the index
comprises nine clauses, this corresponds to approximately 0.7 more clauses protecting
source taxation. This outcome is unexpected. It could be that a higher revenue/GDP is
attributable to a better technical capacity (in a way not capture by the non-signiﬁcant
bureaucratic capacity variable) or that it reﬂects bargaining strength, both of which may
lead to increased negotiating capabilities.
The corporate tax dependence variable in columns 5 to 8 appears to act only onWHT rates
(column 6), and the effect is only signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level. Countries that depend
more on corporate tax as a share of total revenue therefore appear to retain more taxing rights
with respect to WHT rates, consistent with H2B. (It is hard to give an interpretation of this
coefﬁcient because theWHT index is an amalgamation of several continuous variables). This
would seem to support the rationalist negotiating model, as employed by Rixen and Schwarz
(2009), that when countries stand to lose more from tax treaties, they retain more source
taxing rights. Because a larger dependence on corporate tax also increases the likelihood of
signing a treaty overall, however, one interpretation is that countries that depend more on
corporate tax revenue are susceptible to certain incomplete ideas about tax treaties: that
signing them provides net beneﬁts, provided the country negotiates ﬁrmly on the easily
understood WHT provisions. Expressed simply, these countries may believe they have
negotiated good deals, as they have obtained good results on WHT rates; the overall Source
index reveals, however, that they did not obtain a signiﬁcantly better settlement once the less
salient parts of the treaty are taken into account.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, there is a negative relationship between the FDI
asymmetry (columns 9 to 12) and the overall source index (column 9) and a more signiﬁcant
one for the PE deﬁnition (column 11). A more imbalanced FDI relationship means a greater
cost to the developing country of restrictions on its source taxing rights. Yet this result
suggests that developing countries give away more taxing rights in precisely those situations
where the cost of doing so is greater, the opposite of H4. Concretely, a change in the ratio of
FDI stocks between the two countries in the dyad from 0.5 (perfectly symmetrical FDI stocks)
to 1.0 (perfectly asymmetrical FDI stocks) would lead to a reduction in the PE index of 0.10.
This corresponds to approximately one less clause that protects the developing country’s
taxing rights. This is the opposite to Rixen and Schwarz’s (2009) ﬁnding that net capital
importing countries retained more of their taxing rights in WHT rate clauses, and to a lesser
extent in PE clauses, when the FDI relationship was more imbalanced.
There is also a negative and signiﬁcant effect of the capability asymmetry on the PE and
Other indices in several speciﬁcations, except where FDI asymmetry is included. This
seems to add weight to a power-based hypothesis (H3): the FDI and capability asymmetries
are moderately correlated (0.31), and both could be measuring economic power. Rixen and
Schwarz (2009) found no signiﬁcant effect for the capability asymmetry on WHT rates or
PE lengths. The different conclusions between this study and Rixen and Schwarz (2009)
for both FDI and capability could result from either the different speciﬁcation, larger
sample size or sample composition. The latter seems quite likely: power may be a more
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important factor in negotiations with developing countries, and the power asymmetries are
greater in the treaties studied here than those in the earlier study, which included few
developing country treaties.
The ‘learning’ variable is consistently positive throughout most speciﬁcations (H5). In
particular, it has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the ‘other’ provisions index, which
suggests that the learning effect is most relevant to these more obscure provisions of the
treaty. The coefﬁcient of the learning variable on the ‘other’ dependent variable ranges from
0.006 to 0.015 in the different speciﬁcations. This means that after a country has signed 16
more treaties (the standard deviation), the ‘other’ index will be between 0.096 and 0.240
higher. Because the ‘other’ index is made up of nine clauses, this corresponds to between
one and two additional clauses that retain the developing country’s taxing rights.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has replicated two studies of tax treaty negotiation outcomes, integrating ﬁscal
and tax treaty content data. The ﬁndings add further nuance to our understanding of
developing countries’ decision-making over tax treaty negotiations and, in some cases,
challenge the results of these previous studies. First, Barthel and Neumayer’s (2012) study
of the determinants of tax treaty formation was replicated, adding in ﬁscal data from
Prichard et al. (2014) for the less wealthy country in each potential treaty-signing dyad.
Second, Rixen and Schwarz’s (2009) study of the determinants of tax treaty content was
replicated, using the more comprehensive view of treaty content from Hearson (2016),
combined again with the ﬁscal data. As a replication study, the aim was not to make
signiﬁcant changes to the models or design new ones but rather to improve on published
studies by introducing these new data.
Combining the results, we can tell the following story. Developing countries that depend
more on corporate income tax are more likely to sign tax treaties with wealthier countries
and more likely to negotiate higher WHT rates in those treaties, but no more likely to
obtain better results overall. Because WHT rates are the most prominent parts of tax
treaties to non-specialists, this supports a ‘salience’ argument derived from the bounded
rationality literature: policy makers in countries that depend more on corporate tax are
willing to support a policy of signing tax treaties, so long as higher WHT rates are
negotiated, while ignoring other, less easily understood parts of the treaty.
In contrast, developing countries that raise more tax revenue overall are more likely to
negotiate better PE clauses, an area that is less easily understood by non-specialists, as well
as a better overall balance across all provisions of the treaty. Greater tax revenue overall is
thus associated with better negotiation, but it does not make a country more or less likely to
sign tax treaties. Furthermore, the more obscure clauses are less likely to be favourable to
developing countries when the FDI relationship between the two countries is more one-
sided, with the developing country more of a net importer of capital from the treaty partner.
This is the opposite of Rixen and Schwarz’s (2009) ﬁnding, which was that the negotiated
content of tax treaties reﬂects a rational compromise between the two signatories, which
protects the revenue base of the capital importer more when it has more to lose. This could
be because the higher tax/GDP and smaller FDI asymmetry translates into greater
bargaining strength in negotiations. A measure of bureaucratic quality was introduced as
a (necessarily imperfect) proxy for technical negotiating capacity but did not have a
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signiﬁcant effect on the results. The contradiction with Rixen and Schwarz’s (2009)
ﬁndings could also indicate that power asymmetries play a role in negotiations between
developed and developing countries, as in the sample used here, but not in negotiations
between more developed countries, as in the sample used in the 2009 study.
Finally, there is a signiﬁcant and consistent learning effect across most of the
speciﬁcations in the second replication: the more treaties a country has signed, the better
negotiated outcomes it obtains, across all types of provision except the PE clauses. This
applies both to the more salient, easier to understand WHT rates, and to the more
technically obscure provisions in the ‘Other’ index. Negotiators may have gained more
technical knowledge leading to a greater appreciation of the less salient parts of the treaty,
or experience and skills that improved their ability to obtain positive results in
negotiations. Other actors may also have gained a greater interest in the outcome of
negotiations having seen the application of existing treaties in practice. Taken together
with the other results, this suggests that the decision to negotiate and the eventual
negotiated content are a function of power and knowledge-based variables, such as how
salient the losses from the treaty are to policy makers in a country, the knowledge and
experience of negotiators, as well as relative bargaining power. This makes a strong case
for developing countries to revisit their existing treaty networks as their understanding
of their ﬁscal costs grows.
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics for second replication
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Source index 537 0.420 0.136 0.090 0.760
WHT rates index 537 0.322 0.117 0 0.8
PE index 537 0.533 0.269 0.030 0.970
‘Other’ index 537 0.377 0.231 0 1
Revenue/GDP 176 0.194 0.076 0.046 0.545
CIT/Revenue 103 0.168 0.093 0.025 0.391
FDI asymmetry 138 0.776 0.290 0.000 1.000
Capability asymmetry 524 0.607 0.326 0.000 1.000
Learning 520 15.840 15.559 0 63
Bureaucratic quality 395 1.746 0.677 0 3
Year of signature 537 1996.410 11.530 1970 2014
Treaty partner OECD member 537 0.453 0.498 0 1
Developing country Africa region 537 0.389 0.488 0 1
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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